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1 Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to quantitatively test how corporate governance influences the 
value of corporate cash holdings. More specifically, we examine whether valuation of 
corporate cash holdings is consistent with agency theory. To perform the analysis, we employ 
the methods used by Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006). The sample data is hand 
collected from the Worldscope database and consists of 727,681 unique firm years. After the 
dataset was trimmed it finally consisted of 99,079 firm years. Based on these observations, we 
obtain our results using regression analysis. The analysis investigates two hypotheses: 
1. Cash is valued at a discount in countries with weak investor protection. 
2. Dividends contribute more to firm value in countries with weaker investor protection. 
We split the sample data into high investor protection and low investor protection countries, 
based on seven different proxies for investor protection, to investigate the differences between 
the low protection and high protection group. 
The results of our analysis provide strong support for hypothesis 1. However, they do not 
provide any support for hypothesis 2. 
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2 Introduction 
Corporate governance deals with “the ways in which suppliers of finance assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  The existence and quality of 
legal institutions in a country is one of the most important mechanisms in this context.   
Proper functioning of such institutions greatly impacts the firms who operate in the country’s 
business environment. Throughout this thesis, we investigate the role and significance of a 
country’s legal framework in the context of corporate governance. More specifically, we will 
analyze investor protection and how it impacts firm valuation through the value of cash.  
 
The first section of this thesis will discusses corporations’ motives for holding cash and how 
these impact the value of cash. Thereafter, we present data and test design in section 4. Next, 
we will present our results and proceed with a discussion regarding the results’robustness. 
Finally, we conclude based on our findings. 
 
 
3 Theory  
3.1 The motives for holding cash 
A thorough understanding of companies’ motives for holding cash is essential in order to 
investigate the influence of corporate governance on valuation of cash holdings.This section 
summarizes the most prevalent motives for holding cash. These motives have different 
implications for the value of cash. 
Bates, Kahle & Stulz (2009) show that, in the period from 1980 to 2006, companies in the 
United States have doubled the average cash ratio from 10.5% to 23.2%. They explain their 
findings by pointing to four general motives for holding cash:  
 The transaction motive 
 The precautionary motive 
 The tax motive 
 The agency motive  
The transaction motive is based on classic financial models, such as Baumol (1952) and 
Miller & Orr (1966). These models derive the optimal amount of cash a firm should hold 
based on the transaction costs that incur when converting assets to cash in order to make 
current payments. It is necessary for companies to hold some cash for day to day business, 
because inflows and outflows of cash do not always match perfectly. By holding appropriate 
amounts of cash, firms can reduce transaction costs. As they will have the cash needed to 
make current payments, they avoid going to the market to raise cash, which would be costly. 
However, holding excess cash gives rise to higher opportunity costs, as these cash holdings 
could have been used to finance profitable projects. The transaction motive foresees an 
optimal level of cash where the opportunity cost of cash equals the cost of holding, as shown 
in this simple graph based on Baumol (1952). 
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Figure 1: The Transaction Motive 
The transaction motive holds that cash is held to avoid transaction costs. The optimal level of cash is 
at the point where transation costs equals the opportuinity cost. At this point the total cost of holding 
cash is minimized. 
 
Figure 1: The Transaction Motive 
The principle of economies of scale applies to the transaction motive. Thus large firms will in 
general hold relatively lower levels of cash (Mulligan, 1997). 
The precautionary motive: In order to protect themselves against adverse shocks, firms hold 
cash to have easily accessible capital in times when raising capital in the market is expensive. 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) find that firms with riskier cash flows hold 
more cash and thereby provide evidence for this motive. Their findings also support the 
hypothesis that firms with better investment opportunities will hold more cash, due to higher 
opportunity cost in the event of financial distress. Han and Qiu (2007) find that firms that are 
financially constrained have cash holdings that are sensitive to cash flow volatility. Because 
future cash flows are not diversifiable, the level of cash increases when the cash flow 
volatility rises. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) indicate that the precautionary motive is the 
main reason firms have increased their cash holdings from 1980 to 2006. 
Looking at cash as liquidity for the firm, one might argue that cash and lines of credit would 
be substitutes. Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) look at the differences between cash and 
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lines of credit as liquidity sources. They find that cash and lines of credit are not merely 
substitutes but serve different purposes as liquidity sources. Lines of credit are used in good 
times to finance projects, while cash is used in bad times to make up for low inflows of cash. 
Additionaly, lower agency cost could be expected with lines of credits, as they promise a 
fixed part of the cash flow back to the creditors.  
The tax motive arises from tax on repatriation of foreign earnings. If there are high tax costs 
associated with repatriating earnings, this will trigger higher levels of cash (Foley, Hartzell, 
Titman, and Twite, 2007). Also, if dividends are taxed, profits can be kept as cash in the firm 
in order to avoid this taxation, pending legislative changes.  
The agency motive looks at cash held as a result of agency problems. Jensen (1986) argues 
that despite having poor investment opportunities, entrenched managers would keep excess 
cash in the firm rather than paying it out. Managers can ensure their controlling position in the 
firm by holding excess cash. Large cash holdings increase the amount of assets under control 
of the managers, enabling them to increase managerial discretion. The agency motive will 
increase corporate cash holdings above the level held as a result of the precautionary and the 
transaction motive. It is expected that cash held for this reason will have a lower value, as will 
be discussed further in the succeeding subsection. 
3.2 The value of cash 
As emphasized in the previous section, there are several motives for holding cash. The 
various motives will have different implications for the value of the cash holdings. Cash held 
due to precautionary motives will affect firm value in a different way than cash held as a 
result of controlling managers (the agency motive). Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) analyze 
the value of corporate cash holdings. They find that the value of cash is higher when a firm’s 
investment prospects and operating cash flows are more volatile.  This indicates that cash held 
as a result of the precautionary motive will positively impact cash value. The same study 
shows that with poor investment opportunities and low volatility of investment plans and cash 
flows, cash will be valued at a discount. In this situation, the agency motive for holding cash 
dominates and the results imply that cash held as a result of this motive reduces the value of 
cash. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2001) and Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) 
also argue that the agency motive for holding cash implies agency cost, and that an 
incremental dollar held for this motive will be valued at a discount.  The transaction motive 
arises, as mentioned, from the direct cost of converting assets into cash or raising external 
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funds. Holding everything else constant, a dollar held because of this motive is expected to 
have a positive impact on the valuation of cash, at worst no impact. The literature on cash 
held because of the tax motive is limited.  Nevertheless, when cash is held to avoid taxation 
costs, this implies a positive value to shareholders. Further, this motive is aligned with the 
interest of the owners and should therefore not decrease cash value. 
To conclude, the interest of the managers and shareholders are aligned when cash is held as a 
result of the transaction motive, the precautionary motive, and the tax motive. The agency 
motive constitutes a misalignment of interests and will be expected to reduce value for 
shareholders. 
3.2.1 Agency costs of holding cash 
The theoretical basis of this thesis is founded in agency theory and is similar to the foundation 
of the article “Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm 
Value Depend on Governance? A Cross-country Analysis” by Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2006). This thesis focuses on the agency motive for holding cash and 
investigates whether cash is valued at a discount in countries with lower investor protection. 
In countries with low investor protection one expects the agency problem to be present to a 
greater extent, and thereby the agency motive for holding cash to be more prominent than in 
countries with better investor protection. This results in cash being valued at a discount. 
Agency costs can emerge between managers and shareholders or between controlling 
shareholders and other owners. This thesis will discuss both cases.  
According to agency theories, e.g. Jensen (1986), the agents, who control the firm, will 
always act in their own best interest. If owners’ (the principals) and managers’ (the agents) 
interests are not perfectly aligned the managers’ actions will be in conflict with the interests of 
the owners and one faces a so-called agency problem. Also, controlling shareholders’ interests 
may not be aligned with minority shareholders’ interests1. The role of corporate governance is 
to align the interests of the agents and the principals, and thereby eliminate the agency 
problem. If satisfactory corporate governance is not in place, the agents can act to achieve 
private benefits. Such actions will reduce corporate value. According to Myers and Rajan 
(1998), liquid assets are easier to turn into private benefits than are other assets, and are 
therefore well suited for measuring the extent of private benefits. Based on this insight, one 
                                                          
1
 Whether the problem is between owner and manager or controlling owner and minority shareholder, the effect 
and implications are the same. Managers and/or controlling shareholder could wish to hold more cash for private 
benefits and this reduces value for shareholders/minority shareholders. 
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could expect firms in countries with poor shareholder protection to overinvest in cash 
holdings because of the incentive to extract private benefits. Hence, shareholders should value 
liquid assets less in countries with poor shareholder protection compared to countries with 
good shareholder protection.  
However, it could be argued that countries with poor investor protection are generally riskier 
and more volatile than countries with good shareholder protection, and that managers 
therefore need to hold more cash as a buffer. Holding large amounts of cash for this reason 
would be acting in the best interest of the owners. Thus it seems likely that the precautionary 
motive is strong in countries with low investor protection. Cash should then receive equal 
valuation in all countries, regardless of the level of shareholder protection. One could also 
make the case that cash should be valued at a premium in countries with poor investor 
protection. If low investor protection countries have poorly developed financial markets, it 
will make financing expensive. Lack of financing could make companies unable to pursue 
profitable projects. In this situation cash would contribute positively to firm value. 
Nevertheless, research shows that in countries with poor shareholder protection corporate 
governance is inferior and appropriation of private benefits is extensive (La Porta et al, 1998).  
This thesis will investigate if there is a negative relation between poor shareholder protection 
in a country and valuation of liquid assets. In particular it will examine whether liquid assets 
are discounted at a higher rate in countries with poor shareholder protection. Two components 
will be used in determining shareholder protection: legal rights and law enforcement. These 
will be described in detail later.  
An agency problem is present when there are difficulties with motivating one party to act in 
the interest of another. This is a common problem between managers and owners because 
their interests are not perfectly aligned. In many cases such problems will also be present 
between majority and minority shareholders. La Porta et al (1999) find that the controlling 
shareholders typically have control over the firm in excess of their rights to cash flows 
through pyramidal structures or through participation in management. Again, according to 
agency theory, the controlling shareholders or managers (the agents) will always act in their 
own best interest. Hence, if their interests are not perfectly aligned with those of the minority 
shareholders, the minority shareholders will not receive the best possible return on their 
investments. The controlling shareholders can expropriate the minority shareholders and take 
out some of the firm’s assets as private benefits of control. In other words, the controlling 
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shareholders will maximize their own welfare at the expense of the minority shareholders. 
Protection of shareholder rights will determine to what extent the large shareholders can 
extract these private benefits of control. The cost of extracting these benefits will increase as 
minority shareholders receive better protection. Considering this, the external investors’ 
valuation of a firm’s cash holdings should fall when shareholder protection decreases. Given 
this relation, firm value ought to be lower in countries with poor shareholder protection than 
in countries with good shareholder protection – all other things equal.  
When liquid assets are kept within a firm, the majority shareholders have the option and 
opportunity to use these assets to achieve private benefits. This could happen through various 
measures, for example tunneling
2
, investing to secure their position, investing to expand their 
empire or outright theft. Therefore one would expect insiders to pursue a higher level of liquid 
assets in the firm compared to what would be the optimal amount from the minority 
shareholders’ point of view. This is quite intuitive as it is easier to make liquid assets 
disappear than to make for example a plant disappear. In perfect financial markets, this would 
not happen, as firms would then invest in positive NPV
3
 projects and pay out excess cash to 
the investors.  
As discussed above, several motives for holding cash benefit all shareholders and one would 
therefore not expect controlling shareholders to extract all accessible cash. Cash can provide a 
buffer and increased flexibility (the precautionary motive), which enables the firm to handle 
shocks. Furthermore, from the controlling agents’ perspective, excess cash makes it easier to 
retain control of the firm as one can protect oneself and the firm from having to go to 
financial markets to get cash. It enables the controlling agents to avoid a situation that could 
threaten their sovereign control of the firm. The controlling shareholder may take out private 
benefits from liquid assets at any time, either because it is felt that control is threatened or 
simply because one wants to cash out. It is therefore expected that a portion of a firm’s cash 
holdings will be taken out as private benefits in the future and hence, cash should be valued at 
a discount by minority shareholders. Accordingly, we expect cash to be worth less in 
countries with poor shareholder protection when looking at cash holdings from the agency 
perspective. This is supported by Kalcheva and Lins (2007), who find that an incremental 
                                                          
2
 Johnson, La Porta, Lopes-de-silanes, and Shleifer (2000) define tunneling as “the transfer of assets and profits 
out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders”.  An example of this is two firms A and B, where 
person X is the manager in A and 100% owner of B.  If X decide that A should buy services from B, but B 
charges A an overprice, profits are tunneled out of A to the benefit of B (and X) 
3
 NPV = Net present value. A project with a positive net present value will add to firm value 
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dollar in a country with poor shareholder protection is worth $0.76. If the managers are the 
largest shareholder (larger agency problems), the value is as low as $0.39. 
Controlling shareholders clearly benefit from taking out cash from the firm after shares have 
been sold to minority shareholders. Nonetheless, they could also benefit if they were able to 
commit to paying out excess accumulated cash before selling shares for the first time. If they 
credibly commit to doing so, one would achieve a greater firm value and a higher price for 
offered shares, as minority shareholders would value the liquid assets at no discount. The 
problem however is credibility. There are many potential difficulties when trying to make 
such a credible commitment. First of all, there must be a clear definition of what the firm will 
treat as excess cash. Second, in countries where the political system functions poorly and the 
government is corrupt it would be possible for the firm’s management to simply abandon such 
an agreement. In addition, the majority shareholders would have trouble committing to this 
policy as it would decrease their flexibility. This results in a narrower scope of action at times 
when action could be needed to increase firm value. Finally, countries with poor investor 
protection also tend to have undeveloped financial markets, which make the cost of raising 
capital high. Having strict rules on how much capital should be kept in the firm would force 
the firm to go to the capital markets more frequently resulting in high costs. This would 
neither benefit the majority nor the minority shareholders. 
From earlier research (La Porta et al, 2000) it is clear that in countries with poor investor 
protection, firms face higher pressure to pay dividends than firms in countries with high 
investor protection. The reason for this is that in such countries the risk of cash being tunneled 
out of the company in benefit of the controlling shareholders is high. Cash being paid out as 
dividends in countries with poor investor protection is beneficial for minority shareholders, 
that is if the cash cannot be invested profitably inside the firm at a higher rate than what 
shareholders could achieve outside the firm. If one were to include taxes it would complicate 
this reasoning as dividends could be tax disadvantaged. However, if investor protection is 
sufficiently weak, it would more than offset the tax disadvantages.  Thus, in addition to 
expecting that cash would be valued less, one would expect dividends to contribute more to 
firm value in countries with weak investor protection. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) find that 
when there is weak shareholder protection, paying dividends increases firm value and thereby 
support this argument. 
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4 Empirical Approach 
We use the sample of hand collected data and the regression approach utilized by Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson in their paper “Does the contribution of corporate cash holdings and 
dividends to firm value depend on governance? A cross-country analysis” (2006) to test 
whether cash is valued at a discount in countries with poor investor protection and whether 
dividends receive higher valuation in countries with poor investor protection. 
4.1 Data 
The analysis requires firm specific data as well as country specific data on investor protection. 
The data we use covers the time period 1997 through 2008. We have put a considerable 
amount on work into collecting the data by manually downloading the firm specific data from 
Thomson Financial’s Worldscope database using Datastream. Our sample contains 35 
countries. In total we performed over 900 queries to get 727,681 observations with more than 
70,000 unique firms. We downloaded the variables type (firm id), general industry 
classification, total assets, cash, dividends, market capitalization, total debt, research & 
development, interest expenses and earnings for each firm
4
 for each year throughout the 
twelve year period. We will report the firm years 1998 through 2007. As the firm observations 
we use in the regressions are comprised of variables that rely on lead (t+1) and lagged (t-1) 
values, the first and last year only complete our 10 year period.  
By using the period 1998 to 2007, the data will not be affected by the financial crisis. It could 
be interesting to include data from this period and investigate how the crisis affect the value 
of cash, but this is not within the scope of this thesis. However, the sample does include other 
major events with significant economic impact. Examples could be the Asian financial crisis 
(1998), burst of the dotcom or technology bubble (2000), terrorist attack in USA 9/11 (2001), 
the introduction of the Euro (1999 – 2002) and boom years for many countries. The tradeoff 
between a longer investigation period and the significant amount of time required to manually 
download the data, resulted in the final 10-year period between 1998 and 2007.  
There are some concerns with using the Worldscope data. First of all the data is biased 
towards large firms and is thereby not comprehensive. Also, the sample includes data from 
many countries in which accounting standards differ and thus the data might not be identical 
across countries. However, there is no better way of making the data more comparable 
beyond what Worldscope already does.  
                                                          
4
 For more information on datastream codes and definition, see appendix 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Sample from Worldscope. Market to book is market value of equity plus debt divided by assets. Dividends and 
cash are also divided by assets. Each year the median of each variable is calculated and the reported statistic is 
the mean of these time-series medians in the period 1998 to 2007. The statistics on firm numbers show mean, 
median, minimum and maximum number of firms for the period. 
Market to 
book
Dividends Cash
Mean 
numbers of 
firms per 
year
Median 
number of 
firms per 
year
Min. 
number of 
firms
Max 
number of 
firm per 
year.
Argentina 0.731 0.001 0.015 26.10 26 22 32
Australia 1.211 0.006 0.054 580.70 741 188 816
Austria 0.823 0.010 0.051 46.40 45.5 43 50
Belgium 0.898 0.009 0.033 58.10 60 46 65
Brazil 0.811 0.013 0.012 83.70 92 56 103
Canada 1.362 0.000 0.034 312.20 241.5 135 704
Chile 0.945 0.023 0.008 60.00 61.5 48 69
Denmark 0.997 0.009 0.054 73.30 69 63 102
Finland 1.041 0.022 0.043 69.60 70 55 82
France 0.828 0.007 0.047 374.80 390.5 275 442
Germany 0.827 0.005 0.058 326.50 338 271 353
Greece 1.261 0.008 0.032 113.20 123 79 134
Hong Kong 0.743 0.003 0.096 449.50 516.5 224 622
India 0.921 0.010 0.017 402.00 259 166 1479
Ireland 1.186 0.004 0.083 44.50 44 41 51
Italy 0.861 0.007 0.044 120.80 128.5 88 141
Japan 0.750 0.006 0.103 1453.70 1564 1105 1852
Korea (South) 0.668 0.003 0.035 535.50 466.5 204 1042
Malaysia 0.749 0.005 0.020 490.80 563.5 281 607
Mexico 0.795 0.002 0.022 23.60 25.5 9 38
Netherlands 0.997 0.009 0.041 110.10 108 105 122
New Zealand 1.117 0.029 0.015 39.60 40.5 33 47
Norway 1.006 0.006 0.083 63.40 66 46 78
Peru 0.918 0.010 0.016 18.80 20.5 11 24
Philippines 0.664 0.000 0.023 73.70 82 20 104
Portugal 0.857 0.004 0.022 20.70 21 15 26
Singapore 0.802 0.007 0.051 289.50 338.5 151 374
South Africa 0.999 0.018 0.094 102.70 108.5 64 125
Spain 0.997 0.009 0.021 72.70 73.5 65 79
Sweden 1.149 0.016 0.061 111.90 120 78 128
Switzerland 0.999 0.011 0.079 131.80 140.5 98 155
Thailand 0.809 0.010 0.032 221.60 235.5 164 263
Turkey 1.044 0.002 0.030 129.00 141 55 176
United Kingdom 1.078 0.010 0.071 1018.00 1054.5 809 1177
United States 1.387 0.000 0.067 1859.40 1882.5 1639 1988  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the dependent variable as well as the two main variables of interest from the 
Worldscope data. It includes the market value of the firm divided by book value of assets, 
cash and dividends both normalized by the book value of assets. The table also reports the 
number of firms in the sample available for each country. Compared to the dataset used by 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006), our dataset is much more comprehensive. 
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Specifically, we have significantly more observations than the original article. The lowest 
average number of firms per year is Peru with 18.8 and the highest is the United States with 
an average of 1751.2. Within the sample 20 countries have more than 100 firm observations 
on average per year. In comparison Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) have only 13 
countries with an average above 100 firms per year. From Table 1, we get the average market 
to book across countries of 0.949, dividends 0.008 and 0.045 for cash. 
To test the two hypotheses, the sample of countries is divided into two groups: high and low 
investor protection. The objective is to examine whether results differ between the two 
groups. Investor protection has two dimensions: the rights given to investors and the 
enforcement of those rights. The quality of a country’s institutions determines how well the 
rights granted to minority shareholders are respected and enforced. We use seven different 
measures of investor protection. Table 2 gives an overview and a description of the investor 
protection variables. These are identical to the measures used by Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (2006). 
The anti-director rights index of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
measures the rights granted to minority shareholders to protect them against being overruled 
by controlling shareholders. To be precise, we use Shleifers’ revised index to have more up-
to-date information (Harvard University Department of Economics, 2008). The index ranges 
from one to six, where countries with excellent shareholder protection will attain a score of 
six. Detailed information about the construction of this index and other variables can be found 
in Table 2. To measure the quality of institutions and enforcement of laws, two indices from 
the International Country Risk Group is used: the rule of law (law and order) and corruption. 
The formal rights of the investors will be without power in regimes where corruption is high 
or the judiciary in the country is poor. The rule of law assesses a country’s tradition of law 
and order, while the corruption index assesses the risk of corruption of high government 
officials. The expropriation index (La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) is 
used to measure the threat of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization”. In addition 
we use two broader measures of investor protection. One is the International Country Risk 
Guide’s assessment of the political risk in a country (ICRGP). It estimates the country’s 
overall risk based on twelve components, which include corruption and the rule of law. The 
second is the Polcon V index (Henisz, 2000), which is a variable that measures the degree to 
which checks and balances are present in the political system in a country. 
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Table 2: Investor Protection Variables 
Overview of investor protection variables: name, description, and source. 
Variable Description Source 
Anti-director 
index  
Index that measures the degree to which 
shareholders rights are protected. The index 
is formed by adding 1 when; (1) the country 
allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote 
to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required 
to deposit their shares prior to the general 
shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative 
voting or proportional representation of 
minorities in the board of directors is 
allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities 
mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum 
percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal 
to 10 percent, or (6) shareholders have 
preemptive rights that can be waived only 
by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges 
from zero to six. 
Web page of Andrei Shleifer 
http://www.economics.harvar
d.edu/faculty/shleifer/paper 
Law and 
Order 
Assessment of the strength and impartiality 
of the legal system and observance of the 
law 
World Bank (International 
Country Risk Guide) 
Corruption Assessment of corruption within a country 
that threatens development. Scale from 1 to 
10, where low scores indicate that 
government officials are likely to demand 
special payments (higher corruption) 
World Bank (International 
Country Risk Guide) 
Expropriation 
risk Index 
International Country Risk’s assessment of 
the risk of confiscation or forced 
nationalization. Scale from 1 to 10, lower 
scores indicating higher risks. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
ICRGP Measure of political stability based on a 
specific list of country risk factors 
World Bank (International 
Country Risk Guide) 
Polcon V Measure of political concentration of power 
within a country 
Web page of Witold Henisz 
http://www-
management.wharton.upenn.e
du/henisz/ 
Protecting 
investor 
ranking 
Rank of based on the measurement of the 
strength of minority shareholder protection 
from misuse by directors.  
Doing Business 
http://www.doingbusiness.org 
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The presence of checks and balances would imply better investor protection. The index ranges 
from zero (dictatorship) to one (democracy). The data from the International Country Risk 
Guide was obtained from the website of the World Bank, while the Polcon V index is 
downloaded from the Web page of Henisz. Finally, we use the assessment of Doing Business 
(a World Bank Group project). They investigate how well minority shareholders are protected 
against misuse of corporate assets by directors for personal gains (Doing Business, 2012). The 
assessment is comprised into a ranking of countries (Protecting investors ranking).  
We use the seven different measures of investor protection discussed above to test our two 
hypotheses. By using a variety of measures the results are more generalizable than they would 
be if the analysis was limied to only one measure. In other words, the results will be more 
robust if we find equivalent results across different measures.  
A concern that arises from using these seven measures of investor protection is that they could 
merely act as proxies for economic development. This would mean that we have an 
endogeneity problem in our regressions the results might be biased. For this reason, we want 
to investigate further whether the variables for investor protection are proxies for economic 
development. There are many different measures of financial development. We use stock 
market capitalization, stock market turnover, bond market capitalization (excluding 
government debt) and total market capitalization, all normalized by the per capita measure of 
GDP. Table 3 gives an overview of the variables for financial development. 
Table 3: Economic/Financial Development Variables 
Overview of economic and financial development variables: name, description, and source. 
Variable Description Source 
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
Total stock market value normalized 
by GDP 
World Bank 
Stock Market 
Turnover 
Total stock value traded divided by 
stock market capitalization, 
normalized by GDP 
World Bank 
Bond Market 
Capitalization 
Total debt outstanding, excluding 
government debt normalized by GDP 
World Federation of Exchanges 
and Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association 
GDP (per capita) Country gross domestic product per 
capita 
World Bank 
Total Market 
Capitalization 
Stock Market Capitalization plus Bond 
Market Capitalization. 
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Bond market capitalization is based on numbers from the World Federation of Exchanges. In 
our period we see large activity in the merger of stock exchanges. In the Nordic countries the 
Nordic stock exchange is the result of mergers between a number of the Nordic stock 
exchanges. Similarly, Euronext is a collection of merged stock exchanges in Europe. Where 
we do not have separate information on a country’s stock exchange, we use bond market 
capitalization on a merged stock exchange divided by the sum of GDP as a proxy for each 
country
5
. Information on the bond market capitalization is not available for the Phillipines, 
Singapore and Ireland, so for these specific countries we use numbers from Pinkowitz, Stulz 
and Williamson (2006). The numbers from the United States are from the Securities Industry 
and Financial Association. 
Table 4 gives an overview of the investor protection scores of all the countries in our sample. 
The numbers resemble the ones of Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006), but we see a 
general improvement in the anti-directory index scores. We observe great variation within the 
European countries in the score of the anti-director index. Additionally, together with the 
United States, the European countries score lower than the Asian countries on this variable. 
The European countries, especially the Nordic countries, achieve high scores on all other 
investor protection variables.  
Looking at the scores for financial development in Table 4, the European countries in general 
have high scores on all measures, particularly GDP. Norway has the highest GDP per capita 
and is followed by most other European countries, together with the United States and Japan. 
In the other end of the scale we find India, the Philippines and Thailand. The United States are 
ranked 8
th
 on stock market capitalization and 4
th
 on total market capitalization. This is 
somewhat surprising as The United States’ markets generally are considered to be the most 
developed. 
                                                          
5
 Bond market capitalization = ∑      
    
∑     
 
 
 
  
 
    
                                           included 
in the stock exchange 
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Table 4: Investor Protection Scores and Financial Development Scores, Sorted by Country 
The table shows the scores on the various investor protection variables and financial development variables for each country. ICRGP, the overall political risk measure, 
Corruption, the level of government corruption, and Law/Order, the law-and-order tradidion in each country are all from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRGP).  
Polcon V measures political stability, exprisk the expropriation risk, antidir is the anti-director index and ProtInvest is the protecting investors variable from Doing Business. 
In terms of the financial development variables, Scap is stock market capitalization, Sturn is stock market turnover, GDP is GDP per capita, Bcap is bond market 
capitalization and Tcap is total market capitalization. For all the investor protection measures a high score means better protection (e.g. lower corruption). The Protecting 
Investor variable shows the overall rank of the country. For the financial development measures a higher value on the different variables implies higher financial development. 
ICRGP Corruption Law/order Polcon V Exprisk Antidir ProtInvest, rank Scap Sturn GDP Bcap Tcap
Argentina 72.08 4.66 5.50 0.59 5.91 2 117 0.44 0.12 5 789.038 0.04 0.48
Australia 88.76 8.13 9.72 0.87 9.27 4 70 1.14 0.73 26 881.047 0.03 1.17
Austria 89.30 8.13 10.00 0.75 9.69 2.5 100 0.29 0.37 31 527.336 0.24 0.53
Belgium 85.70 6.63 8.50 0.89 9.63 3 19 0.76 0.35 30 163.265 0.07 0.83
Brazil 66.28 5.03 4.09 0.76 7.62 5 82 0.46 0.43 4 241.773 0.03 0.49
Canada 89.17 8.50 10.00 0.86 9.67 4 4 1.14 0.67 28 800.457 0.23 1.37
Chile 79.38 6.72 8.50 0.76 7.5 4 32 0.98 0.12 6 151.481 0.18 1.16
Denmark 90.59 9.44 10.00 0.77 9.67 4 32 0.65 0.77 39 745.020 1.05 1.70
Finland 96.42 10.00 10.00 0.77 9.67 3.5 70 1.47 1.03 31 497.325 0.45 1.91
France 80.47 6.25 8.31 0.75 9.65 3.5 82 0.88 0.91 28 671.436 0.14 1.03
Germany 88.32 7.94 8.69 0.84 9.9 3.5 100 0.53 1.24 29 420.690 0.75 1.27
Greece 80.36 5.41 6.81 0.41 7.12 2 117 0.75 0.60 17 173.879 0.01 0.76
Hong Kong 77.12 6.44 8.22 0.67 8.29 5 3 3.71 0.52 25 639.831 0.33 4.04
India 67.56 4.56 7.00 0.74 7.75 5 49 0.54 1.50 606.744 0.02 0.56
Ireland 91.63 5.78 10.00 0.76 9.67 5 6 0.65 0.55 38 059.354 0.12 0.77
Italy 79.35 4.84 7.47 0.72 9.35 2 49 0.50 1.23 25 749.756 0.28 0.78
Japan 85.62 5.78 8.69 0.76 9.67 4.5 19 0.80 0.88 34 132.058 0.03 0.83
Korea (South) 77.88 5.13 7.94 0.75 8.31 4.5 49 0.63 2.56 13 840.989 0.19 0.82
Malaysia 73.08 4.84 6.44 0.65 7.95 5 4 1.46 0.34 4 603.805 0.02 1.47  
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Table 4 continued: Investor Protection Scores and Financial Development Scores, Sorted by Country 
ICRGP Corruption Law/order Polcon V Exprisk Antidir ProtInvest, rank Scap Sturn GDP Bcap Tcap
Mexico 71.82 4.56 4.75 0.39 7.29 3 49 0.25 0.28 6 775.925 0.02 0.28
Netherlands 92.84 8.88 10.00 0.77 9.98 2.5 117 1.20 1.33 32 690.323 0.41 1.61
New Zealand 90.41 9.06 9.72 0.76 9.69 4 1 0.39 0.42 20 485.925 0.86 1.26
Norway 91.27 8.50 10.00 0.77 9.88 3.5 25 0.52 1.03 51 555.685 0.15 0.67
Peru 63.41 5.03 5.50 0.49 5.54 3.5 13 0.37 0.10 2 537.627 0.05 0.42
Philippines 69.61 4.28 4.66 0.47 5.22 4 128 0.46 0.22 1 149.552 0.00 0.46
Portugal 87.97 7.09 8.50 0.75 8.9 2.5 49 0.44 0.71 15 273.641 0.08 0.53
Singapore 86.59 7.56 9.06 0.67 9.3 5 2 1.89 0.58 25 984.731 0.19 2.09
South Africa 69.80 4.75 4.56 0.74 6.88 5 10 1.92 0.42 3 938.183 0.03 1.95
Spain 82.42 7.00 7.94 0.74 9.52 5 100 0.86 1.80 20 828.907 0.32 1.18
Sweden 92.40 9.06 10.00 0.77 9.4 3.5 32 1.14 1.13 35 048.357 0.43 1.58
Switzerland 90.54 7.94 8.88 0.87 9.98 3 169 2.58 0.96 43 745.299 0.79 3.37
Thailand 66.27 3.44 6.16 0.57 7.42 4 13 0.55 0.86 2 348.262 0.03 0.57
Turkey 63.74 4.66 7.47 0.72 7 3 70 0.28 1.56 5 354.552 0.01 0.29
United Kingdom 86.89 7.75 9.63 0.74 9.71 5 10 1.48 1.12 31 996.945 0.82 2.30
United States 84.98 7.38 8.88 0.85 9.98 3 6 1.42 1.61 38 483.809 0.67 2.09
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As some of the investor protection measures seem somewhat puzzling, we want to investigate 
whether they are consistent with one another. As they are all intended to measure the same 
characteristic, they should be highly correlated. The correlation matrix for all seven variables 
is reported in Table 5. Most of the variables do correlate like one would expect them to do. 
However, the anti-directory index stands out again. This variable correlates negatively with 
three of our investor protection variables and two of the economic development measures. 
Therefore, there is reason to suspect that the anti-directory index is not a good criterion for 
measuring investor protection. The same can be said about the protecting investor variable, 
but as this is a ranking of 185 countries, looking at the correlation between this variable and 
the others is not as intuitive. In addition, we note that most of the investor protection variables 
are highly correlated with the three gauges of economic development. This causes a potential 
problem with causality which we will discuss in detail later. 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix:   
Correlation between the various investor protection and economic development variables.  ICRGP, the overall 
political risk measure, Corruption, the level of government corruption, and Law/Order, the law-and-order 
tradidion in each country are all from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRGP).  Polcon V measures 
political stability, exprisk the expropriation risk, antidir is the anti-director index and ProtInvest is the protecting 
investors variable from Doing Business. In terms of the financial development variables, Scap is stock market 
capitalization, Sturn is stock market turnover, GDP is GDP per capita, Bcap is bond market capitalization and 
Tcap is total market capitalization.  
ICRGP 1
Corruption 0.882 1
Law/order 0.886 0.838 1
Polcon V 0.576 0.587 0.650 1
Exprisk 0.851 0.745 0.844 0.743 1
Antidirr -0.145 -0.088 -0.055 0.135 0.011 1
ProtInvest 0.013 0.003 -0.147 -0.095 -0.115 -0.468 1
Scap 0.193 0.231 0.183 0.215 0.206 0.326 -0.125 1
Sturn 0.152 0.119 0.298 0.364 0.382 0.058 0.109 -0.012 1
GDP 0.864 0.750 0.820 0.579 0.858 -0.138 -0.018 0.271 0.246 1
Bcap 0.573 0.686 0.551 0.425 0.579 -0.013 0.012 0.249 0.252 0.570 1
Tcap 0.365 0.437 0.349 0.333 0.379 0.274 -0.102 0.941 0.078 0.430 0.562 1
TcapICRGP Corruption Law/order Polcon V Exprisk Antidir ProtInvest Scap Sturn GDP Bcap
 
4.2 Test design 
The regression approach used by Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006) is well suited for 
our analysis. This model explains cross-sectional variation in firm values effectively in 
despite of it being ad-hoc in the sense that it does not specify a functional form resulting 
directly from a theoretical model. The goal of using this regression approach is to isolate the 
effect of liquidity by splitting assets up into two components: net assets and liquidity. The 
first regression model considers the change in cash:  
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(1)      Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 
+ β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dLi,t + β16dLi,t+1 + 
β17dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
Where Xt is the level of variable X in year t; dXt is the change in the level of X from year t-1 
to year t, Xt – Xt-1, divided by assets in year t ; dXt+1 is the change in the level of X from year 
t to year t+1 , Xt+1 – Xt. All variables are divided by the value of total assets. By doing this we 
adjust for firm size and reduce the potential problem of heteroscedasticity. Table 6 defines the 
variables in the regression. 
Table 6: Explanatory Variables  
Overview of the explanatory variables included in our regressions: name and definition 
Variable 
name 
Definition 
V Market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year end as the sum of market 
value of equity, the book value of short-term debt and book value of long-term 
debt. 
E Earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and 
investment tax credits 
NA Net assets= Total assets – liquid assets 
RD Research and Development (R&D) expense; 0 if value is missing. 
I Interest expense 
D Dividends calculated as common dividends paid 
L Liquid assets = cash plus marketable securities 
 
Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson (2006) express concerns with regression model (1), as 
expectations about future growth may change when cash holdings increase. Even though the 
lead variable should pick up on expectations, they introduce a second regression model where 
the lead and lag of cash is replaced with the level of cash. We will do the same in our 
analysis, and thus additionally employ regression model (2). 
(2)      Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 
+ β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15Li,t + β16dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
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The objective is to test whether there is a difference in the value of cash and the value of 
dividends depending on the level of investor protection. The first hypothesis is that cash is 
valued at a discount in countries with low investor protection. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Cash is valued at a discount in countries with weak investor protection 
 
To test this we need to look at the estimated coefficient on the change in cash and level of 
cash; β15 in regression models (1) and (2). If hypothesis 1 holds, β15 should be larger in 
countries with high investor protection than in countries with low investor protection. 
 
The second hypothesis resulting from agency theory is that dividends should be of greater 
value in countries with low investor protection. This gives us our hypothesis two: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Dividends contribute more to firm value in countries with weaker 
   investor protection. 
Hypothesis 2 holds if the estimated coefficient on dividends; β12 in equation (1) and (2) is 
larger in countries with lower investor protection. 
To investigate the hypotheses, we employ pooled OLS regressions to model (1) and (2). 
Formally, this entails pooling all observations before performing a standard OLS-regression. 
This implies that we assume all coefficients and intercepts to be identical across all firms. We 
thereby neglect the heterogeneity of the firms in our sample. If there are firm specific effects 
present in our sample, the error term will be correlated with the explanatory variables and our 
results arel possibly inconsistent and biased. A fixed effects regression eliminates time 
invariant firm specific effects and mitigates the potential bias. It utilizes more of the 
information in our sample and increases the robustness of the results. Corresponding results 
are presented in addition to the OLS estimates. (Note that the original article only presents 
OLS estimates). In all our regressions we controlled for heteroscedasticity by using robust 
standard errors. 
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5 Results 
To test the two hypotheses we use regression models (1) and (2) and perform pooled OLS and 
fixed effects regressions as described in the previous section. Our original sample contains 
727,680 observations with more than 70,000 unique firms. First, we drop the industries utility, 
banks, insurance and other financials because these industries will usually have abnormal 
capital structures and are not representative for firms in general. Thereafter we clean our data 
and construct the variables needed to perform our regressions. Finally we drop 0.5% in each 
tail of each variable to reduce the effect of outliers. Our final sample contains 99,079 
observations. 
We perform the regressions for different sub-samples of high and low investor protection.  All 
the relevant results for our analysis are reported in Table 15 and 16 later in this chapter. For 
the variable corruption, we will give a comprehensive presentation of the results, showing all 
the regression transcripts. Corruption was chosen arbitrarily from the seven measures of 
investor protection. The method employed for the corruption variable is applied in the same 
way to the other six measures of investor protection. We only show the full regression 
transcripts for one variable because of the limited contribution of reporting the total of 56 
regressions. 
Countries with scores on corruption below the median value are classified as high corruption 
countries while countries with scores above median value are classified as low corruption 
countries. Thus, countries with little corruption are placed in the group for high investor 
protection and countries with more extensive corruption are placed in the low investor 
protection group. When dividing into groups based on the median, the group with low 
investor protection countries has a total of 46,640 observations, while the high investor 
protection group has a total of 52,439 observations. Table 7 shows the results of our 
regression using regression model (1) on high corruption countries. Table 8 shows 
corresponding results for countries with low corruption.  
As mentioned, we need to study the estimated coefficient on liquidity,    , to analyze 
hypothesis 1 and the estimated coefficient on dividends,    , to analyze hypothesis 2. In 
countries with high corruption we estimate the value of     to 1.29, while in countries with 
low corruption the estimated value is 1.84, both statistically significant at a 1% level.  Thus, a 
one-dollar increase in liquid assets is associated with a 1.29 dollar increase in firm value in 
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countries with high corruption and a 1.84 dollar increase in firm value in countries with low 
corruption. The estimated coefficient on dividends is 12.8 in countries with high corruption 
and 14.65 in countries with low corruption. To test whether the differences between the 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant, we perform a regression with dummy 
variables (not reported). We introduce a dummy variable for corruption which equals 1 if the 
country is identified as low corruption and 0 if it is identified as high corruption to obtain the 
p-value of the difference. We let the dummy variable interact with all the independent 
variables in our regression and allow for the two groups to have different intercepts as well as 
different slopes. Finally we observe the t-statistic of the interaction variables to determine 
whether the difference between the samples in the value of cash and dividends is statistically 
significant. The t-statistic for the difference in dividends,    , is 1.25, making the difference 
between the groups insignificant. The difference in our estimated interaction variable for cash, 
   , has a t-statistic of 1.60, making this difference insignificant as well. These findings 
provide no support for hypothesis 1 or 2. We note that there is a substantial difference in the 
explained variance between the two regressions. Our model for low corruption countries has 
an R-squared value of 0.2726 while the R-squared value for high corruption countries is 
0.0589. This means that more of the variation in the dataset is explained by the included 
independent variables for the low corruption countries than for the high corruption countries. 
In both regressions, most of the coefficients are significant at a 1% level. In the high 
corruption regression, the coefficient on dRDi+t is significant only at a 10% level and dEi,t+1 
and dVi,1+t are insignificant. In both regressions, coefficients for Ii,t and dIi,t+1 are insignificant. 
The low t-statistics for interest expense is a result of the very limited number of observations 
for this variable. 
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Table 7 Regression Result Model (1) – High Corruption: 
Results from OLS regression for countries with high corruption (low investor protection) utilizing the approach 
of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (1) change in cash. Xt is the level of variable X in year t; dXt 
is the change in the level of X from year t-1 to year t, Xt – Xt-1, divided by assets in year t ; dXt+1 is the change in 
the level of X from year t to year t+1 , Xt+1 – Xt. All variables are divided by the value of total assets. V is the 
market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year end as the sum of market value of equity, the book value of 
short-term debt and book value of long-term debt. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred 
tax credits, and investment tax credits. NA equals total assets minus liquid assets, RD, is Research and 
Development expense; 0 if value is missing, I is Interest expense, D is dividends calculated as common 
dividends paid, and L is liquid assets (cash plus marketable securities). The estimated regression is: 
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + 
β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dLi,t + β16dLi,t+1 + β17dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
Linear regression Number of obs 46640
F( 17, 46622) =   89.72
Prob > F =  0.0000
R-squared =  0.0589
Root MSE =  1.8228
Robust 
V Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Ei,t     -.7721699 .2495149 -3.09 0.002 -1.261223 -.283117
dEi,t  .5942984 .1058696 55.61 0.000 .3867924 .8018044
dEi,t+1   .4877639 .3646227 111.34 0.181 -.226902 1.20243
dNAi,t   .5158644 .0510776 110.10 0.000 .4157516 .6159771
dNAi,t+1    .6042426 .1508388 44.01 0.000 .3085962 .899889
RDi,t   5.103263 .4378224 111.66 0.000 4.245124 5.961401
dRDi,t   1.55452 .800116 111.94 0.052 -.0137188 3.122759
dRDi,t+1   4.909108 1.140965 44.30 0.000 1763423 7.145416
Ii,t    6.097404 13.18605 0.46 0.644 -19.74745 31.94225
dIi,t  1220.289 327.351 33.73 0.000 578.6766 1861.902
dIi,t+1   -340.2221 241.4499 -1.41 0.159 -813.4674 133.0232
Di,t  12.80872 .7739876 16.55 0.000 11.29169 14.32574
dDi,t  2.37948 .7075406 33.63 0.001 .9926899 3.76627
dDi,t+1 8.691523 1.067096 88.15 0.000 6.599998 10.78305
dLi,t   1.294662 .2524509 55.13 0.000 .7998549 1.78947
dLi,t+1  1.310766 .4530843 22.89 0.004 .4227137 2.198818
dVi,t+1   -.0884336 .1247174 -0.71 0.478 -.3328815 .1560143
Constant    .832873 .0129622 64.25 0.000 .8074669 .8582791  
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Table 8: Regression Result Model (1) – Low Corruption 
Results from OLS regression for countries with low corruption (high investor protection) utilizing the approach 
of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (1) change in cash. Xt is the level of variable X in year t; dXt 
is the change in the level of X from year t-1 to year t, Xt – Xt-1, divided by assets in year t ; dXt+1 is the change in 
the level of X from year t to year t+1 , Xt+1 – Xt. All variables are divided by the value of total assets. V is the 
market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year end as the sum of market value of equity, the book value of 
short-term debt and book value of long-term debt. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred 
tax credits, and investment tax credits. NA equals total assets minus liquid assets, RD, is Research and 
Development expense; 0 if value is missing, I is Interest expense, D is dividends calculated as common 
dividends paid, and L is liquid assets (cash plus marketable securities). The estimated regression is:  
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + 
β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dLi,t + β16dLi,t+1 + β17dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
Linear regression Number of obs 52439
F( 17, 52421) =  109.59
Prob > F =  0.0000
R-squared =  0.2726
Root MSE =  2.9585
Robust
V Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Ei,t    -3.942163 .325969 -12.09 0.000 -4.581065 -3.303261
dEi,t .6614516 .1579207 44.19 0.000 .3519257 .9709776
dEi,t+1   -.9786003 .157971 -6.19 0.000 -1.288225 -.6689756
dNAi,t  1.401699 .1450834 99.66 0.000 1.117334 1.686064
dNAi,t+1 .8066034 .0781307 110.32 0.000 .6534665 .9597403
RDi,t  4.062311 .3865868 110.51 0.000 3.304598 4.820025
dRDi,t 3.352367 .7987293 44.20 0.000 1.78685 4.917883
dRDi,t+1 9.21493 .7846707 111.74 0.000 7.676968 10.75289
Ii,t   -288.7836 284.2177 -1.02 0.310 -845.8528 268.2856
dIi,t 1990.428 683.093 22.91 0.004 651.5594 3329.297
dIi,t+1 443.9569 672.3684 0.66 0.509 -873.8914 1761.805
Di,t  14.6473 1.248235 111.73 0.000 12.20075 17.09385
dDi,t 2.151714 .7357169 22.92 0.003 .7097017 3.593725
dDi,t+1 11.10699 .8355209 13.29 0.000 9.46936 12.74462
dLi,t  1.839369 .2268328 88.11 0.000 1.394775 2.283963
dLi,t+1 1.778643 .2273879 77.82 0.000 1.332961 2.224325
dVi,t+1  -.164827 .0387543 -4.25 0.000 -.2407857 -.0888683
Constant 1.21862 .0255064 47.78 0.000 1.168628 1.268613  
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Table 9: Regression Result Model (1) – Fixed-effects, High Corruption 
Results from fixed-effects regression for countries with high corruption (low investor protection) utilizing the 
approach of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (1) change in cash. Xt is the level of variable X in 
year t; dXt is the change in the level of X from year t-1 to year t, Xt – Xt-1, divided by assets in year t ; dXt+1 is 
the change in the level of X from year t to year t+1 , Xt+1 – Xt. All variables are divided by the value of total 
assets. V is the market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year end as the sum of market value of equity, the 
book value of short-term debt and book value of long-term debt. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus 
interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. NA equals total assets minus liquid assets, RD, is 
Research and Development expense; 0 if value is missing, I is Interest expense, D is dividends calculated as 
common dividends paid, and L is liquid assets (cash plus marketable securities). The estimated regression is: 
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + 
β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dLi,t + β16dLi,t+1 + β17dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
Fixed-effects (within) regression = 46640
Group variable: typenum = 9054
= 1
= 95.2
= 10
= 22.49
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0031 = 0.0000
Robust
V Coef. Std. Err. t            P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Ei,t   -.055523 .2209619 -.4886583 .3776122
dEi,t .2027751 .1087887 -.0104753 .4160255
dEi,t+1 .2103081 .1447566 -.0734475 .4940638
dNAi,t  .2022612 .0806036 .0442601 .3602624
dNAi,t+1 .5728721 .0979622 .380844 .7649002
RDi,t  .1138903 1.122802 -2.087056 2.314837
dRDi,t 2.240879 .8272428 .619296 3.862462
dRDi,t+1 2.420318 1.033909 .3936231 4.447012
Ii,t  20.47317 8.587693 3.639353 37.30699
dIi,t 592.3794 203.726 193.0304 991.7285
dIi,t+1 -183.5251 197.3074 -570.2922 203.242
Di,t  7.475721 .9707349 5.572861 9.378581
dDi,t .7699078 .5702217 -.3478556 1.887671
dDi,t+1 4.277066 .6603488 2.982634 5.571499
dLi,t  .7466438 .172048 .4093908 1.083897
dLi,t+1 .9868524 .3249072 .3499609 1.623744
dVi,t+1 -.1905617 .0919518 -.3708079 -.0103155
Constant .9514833 .015178 .921731 .9812356
sigma_u 1.7994794
sigma_e 1.3570194
rho .63747313 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
6.48   0.000
4.34   0.000
3.04   0.002
-2.07   0.038
62.69   0.000
1.35   0.177
1.86   0.062
1.45   0.146
2.51   0.012
5.85   0.000
0.10   0.919
2.71   0.007
2.34   0.019
2.38   0.017
2.91   0.004
-0.93   0.352
7.70   0.000
-0.25   0.802
Number of obs
Number of groups
R-sq:  within  = 0.0576 Obs per group: min
between = 0.0356 avg
overall = 0.0389 max
F(17,9053)
Prob > F
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Table 10: Regression result Model (1) – Fixed-effects, Low Corruption 
Results from fixed-effects regression for countries with low corruption (high investor protection) utilizing the 
approach of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (1) change in cash. Xt is the level of variable X in 
year t; dXt is the change in the level of X from year t-1 to year t, Xt – Xt-1, divided by assets in year t ; dXt+1 is 
the change in the level of X from year t to year t+1 , Xt+1 – Xt. All variables are divided by the value of total 
assets. V is the market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year end as the sum of market value of equity, the 
book value of short-term debt and book value of long-term debt. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus 
interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. NA equals total assets minus liquid assets, RD, is 
Research and Development expense; 0 if value is missing, I is Interest expense, D is dividends calculated as 
common dividends paid, and L is liquid assets (cash plus marketable securities). The estimated regression is: 
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + 
β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dLi,t + β16dLi,t+1 + β17dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
Fixed-effects (within) regression = 52439
Group variable: typenum = 11928
= 1
= 94.4
= 10
= 47.00
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0407 = 0.0000
Robust
V Coef. Std. Err. t           P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Ei,t   -3.455484 .8194449 -5.06173 -1.849239
dEi,t .6358725 .2038662 .2362616 1.035483
dEi,t+1 -1.039255 .2869374 -1.601699 -.4768112
dNAi,t  .9957965 .2291687 .5465885 1.445004
dNAi,t+1 .9792396 .0532257 .8749086 1.083571
RDi,t  2.419268 1.00387 .4515196 4.387015
dRDi,t 1.966931 .7557984 .4854432 3.448419
dRDi,t+1 6.769825 .9328837 4.941221 8.598429
Ii,t  -285.0692 601.1564 -1463.434 893.2952
dIi,t 784.7159 528.6943 -251.611 1821.043
dIi,t+1 -2897.186 2122.477 -7057.586 1263.214
Di,t  12.87675 1.849572 9.251289 16.50221
dDi,t .280154 .6169275 -.9291244 1.489432
dDi,t+1 8.114144 .9861898 6.181052 10.04724
dLi,t  1.40197 .2330196 .9452139 1.858727
dLi,t+1 1.877221 .176234 1.531774 2.222668
dVi,t+1 -.2708412 .0257324 -.3212808 -.2204015
Constant 1.353895 .0593848 1.237491 1.470299
sigma_u 3.7149222
sigma_e 1.9683859
rho .78079201 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
-10.53   0.000
22.80   0.000
0.45   0.650
3.12   0.002
-3.62   0.000
4.35   0.000
18.40   0.000
2.41   0.016
2.60   0.009
7.26   0.000
-0.47   0.635
1.48   0.138
-1.37   0.172
6.96   0.000
R-sq:  within  = 0.2290 Obs per group: min
between = 0.2395 avg
overall = 0.2600 max
8.23   0.000
6.02   0.000
10.65   0.000
-4.22   0.000
Number of obs
Number of groups
F(17,11927)
Prob > F
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The fixed-effects regressions (Table 9 and Table 10) give different results. The values of the 
estimated coefficients are lower than the values we find in the OLS regressions. In addition, 
both differences (in liquidity and dividends) are now significant. In the group of countries 
with high corruption, we estimate a     of 0.75, while countries with low corruption     has 
an estimated value of 1.40. The coefficient on dividends,    , has a value of 7.48 in high 
corruption and a value of 12.88 in low corruption countries. The t-statistics from the 
regression with interaction variables (not reported) has a value of 2.26 for the difference in 
    and 2.59 for    . This makes the differences statistically significant at the 5% and 1% 
level. This provides support for hypothesis 1. However, we find no support for hypothesis 2 
as the relation for dividends is opposite of what we expect. 
Table 11 through 14 show the results using regression model (2) – the level of cash. Again we 
perform regressions using corruption as the investor protection proxy. Table 11 and 12 report 
the results from the OLS regressions. When corruption is high, we estimate      to 1.96 and 
when corruption is low, the estimated value is 2.27. The estimated values for      are 11.9 for 
high corruption countries and 15.01 for low corruption countries. The t-statistics for the 
difference between the high and low investor protection groups is 1.23 for     and 2.10 for 
   , making the difference in     insignificant while     is significant at a 5%-level.  The 
results do not provide support for hypothesis 1 and suggests rejection of hypothesis 2.  
Furthermore we look at the results from the fixed-effects regression (Table 13 and 14). The 
estimated values of     are 7.02 for high corruption and 12.11 for low corruption. The 
estimated values of      are 0.93 and 1.11. The difference in     is significant at a 5%-level, 
but the difference in     is not significant. Again, we find no support for hypothesis 1 and 
suggested rejection of hypothesis 2.  
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Table 11: Regression Result Model (2) – High Corruption 
Results from OLS regression for countries with high corruption (low investor protection) utlizing the approach 
of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (2) level of cash. Xt is the level of variable X in year t; dXt is 
the change in the level of X from year t-1 to year t, Xt – Xt-1, divided by assets in year t ; dXt+1 is the change in 
the level of X from year t to year t+1 , Xt+1 – Xt. All variables are divided by the value of total assets. V is the 
market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year end as the sum of market value of equity, the book value of 
short-term debt and book value of long-term debt. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred 
tax credits, and investment tax credits. NA equals total assets minus liquid assets, RD, is Research and 
Development expense; 0 if value is missing, I is Interest expense, D is dividends calculated as common 
dividends paid, and L is liquid assets (cash plus marketable securities). The estimated regression is:  
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + 
β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15Li,t + β16dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
 
Linear regression Number of obs 46640
F( 16, 46623) =  110.26
Prob > F =  0.0000
R-squared =  0.0644
Root MSE =  1.8175
Robust
V Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Ei,t      -.7052 .2530104 -2.79 0.005 -1.201104 -.2092958
dEi,t   .5923125 .1046473 55.66 0.000 .3872023 .7974227
dEi,t+1    .5766837 .3634953 111.59 0.113 -.1357724 1.28914
dNAi,t     .5711402 .0506522 111.28 0.000 .4718611 .6704193
dNAi,t+1    .6195929 .1575143 33.93 0.000 .3108627 .9283232
RDi,t    3.637929 .4360028 88.34 0.000 2.783357 4.492501
dRDi,t   2.412007 .7838606 33.08 0.002 .8756283 3.948385
dRDi,t+1   4.888275 1.099709 44.45 0.000 2.732829 7.043722
Ii,t     .0142754 13.46903 0.00 0.999 -26.38522 26.41377
dIi,t    911.8356 352.3668 22.59 0.010 221.1914 1602.48
dIi,t+1   -220.6921 240.7408 -0.92 0.359 -692.5476 251.1635
Di,t    11.90224 .7986935 14.90 0.000 10.33679 13.46769
dDi,t   2.331785 .703896 33.31 0.001 .9521382 3.711431
dDi,t+1   8.346253 1.061013 77.87 0.000 6.266652 10.42585
Li,t  1.959051 .1448954 13.52 0.000 1.675054 2.243048
dVi,t+1    -.0740771 .1197274 -0.62 0.536 -.3087446 .1605904
Constant    .6927012 .0169297 40.92 0.000 .6595187 .7258836  
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Table 12: Regression Result Model (2) – Low Corruption 
Results from OLS regression for countries with low corruption (high investor protection) utilizing the approach 
of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (2) level of cash. Xt is the level of variable X in year t; dXt is 
the change in the level of X from year t-1 to year t, Xt – Xt-1, divided by assets in year t ; dXt+1 is the change in 
the level of X from year t to year t+1 , Xt+1 – Xt. All variables are divided by the value of total assets. V is the 
market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year end as the sum of market value of equity, the book value of 
short-term debt and book value of long-term debt. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred 
tax credits, and investment tax credits. NA equals total assets minus liquid assets, RD, is Research and 
Development expense; 0 if value is missing, I is Interest expense, D is dividends calculated as common 
dividends paid, and L is liquid assets (cash plus marketable securities). The estimated regression is:  
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + 
β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15Li,t + β16dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
Linear regression Number of obs 52439
F( 16, 52422) =  133.04
Prob > F =  0.0000
R-squared =  0.2694
Root MSE =   2.965
Robust
V Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Ei,t    -3.820106 .3233665 -11.81 0.000 -4.453908 -3.186305
dEi,t   .6287429 .1585007 53.97 0.000 .3180801 .9394056
dEi,t+1    -.9639737 .1592286 -6.05 0.000 -1.276063 -.6518842
dNAi,t      1.470733 .140873 110.44 0.000 1.194621 1.746846
dNAi,t+1   .8184844 .0828359 99.88 0.000 .6561252 .9808436
RDi,t    3.143251 .4184164 77.51 0.000 2.323151 3.963351
dRDi,t    3.459761 .8085196 44.28 0.000 1.875055 5.044467
dRDi,t+1    9.510461 .7850158 112.11 0.000 7.971823 11.0491
Ii,t     274.2882 479.4728 0.57 0.567 -665.4828 1214.059
dIi,t    2698.084 483.0542 55.59 0.000 1751.293 3644.875
dIi,t+1  1939.839 990.9272 111.96 0.050 -2.387309 3882.066
Di,t   15.01147 1.247593 112.03 0.000 12.56618 17.45677
dDi,t    1.199654 .72364 111.66 0.097 -.2186873 2.617995
dDi,t+1   10.88694 .8424306 112.92 0.000 9.235769 12.53811
Li,t    2.26916 .2060745 111.01 0.000 1.865252 2.673068
dVi,t+1  -.1371213 .0363836 -3.77 0.000 -.2084335 -.0658092
Constant   1.019609 .0305213 33.41 0.000 .9597864 1.079431  
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Table 13: Regression Result Model (2) – Fixed-effects, High Corruption 
Results from fixed-effects regression for countries with high corruption (low investor protection) utilizing the 
approach of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (2) level of cash. Xt is the level of variable X in 
year t; dXt is the change in the level of X from year t-1 to year t, Xt – Xt-1, divided by assets in year t ; dXt+1 is 
the change in the level of X from year t to year t+1 , Xt+1 – Xt. All variables are divided by the value of total 
assets. V is the market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year end as the sum of market value of equity, the 
book value of short-term debt and book value of long-term debt. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus 
interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. NA equals total assets minus liquid assets, RD, is 
Research and Development expense; 0 if value is missing, I is Interest expense, D is dividends calculated as 
common dividends paid, and L is liquid assets (cash plus marketable securities). The estimated regression is: 
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + 
β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15Li,t + β16dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
Fixed-effects (within) regression = 46640
Group variable: typenum = 9054
= 1
= 95.2
= 10
= 28.34
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0123 = 0.0000
Robust
V Coef. Std. Err. t               P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Ei,t   -.0320272 .2304717 -.4838039 .4197495
dEi,t .2138684 .1096155 -.0010028 .4287396
dEi,t+1 .2648688 .1497268 -.0286297 .5583672
dNAi,t  .2319401 .0830173 .0692075 .3946727
dNAi,t+1 .5811988 .1062987 .3728293 .7895682
RDi,t  -.0822903 1.12278 -2.283192 2.118612
dRDi,t 2.294586 .8588165 .6111115 3.97806
dRDi,t+1 2.562752 1.025376 .5527841 4.57272
Ii,t  7.684242 16.08475 -23.8455 39.21398
dIi,t 113.1926 399.9189 -670.7388 897.124
dIi,t+1 154.6171 275.7838 -385.9815 695.2158
Di,t  7.023417 .9849153 5.092761 8.954074
dDi,t .7698585 .5784237 -.3639827 2606738
dDi,t+1 4.124244 .6678444 2.815118 5.43337
Li,t .929453 .2780242 .3844627 1.474443
dVi,t+1 -.1787743 .0883513 -.3519628 -.0055859
Constant .8847567 .0288906 .8281247 .9413888
sigma_u 1.7910963
sigma_e 1.3591606
rho .6345812 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
30.62   0.000
1.33   0.183
5.47   0.000
-0.07   0.942
6.18   0.000
3.34   0.001
-2.02   0.043
7.13   0.000
2.67   0.008
2.50   0.012
0.48   0.633
0.28   0.777
0.56   0.575
Number of obs
Number of groups
F(17,11927)
1.95   0.051
1.77   0.077
2.79   0.005
R-sq:  within  = 0.0546 Obs per group: min
between = 0.0462 avg
overall = 0.0427 max
-0.14   0.889
Prob > F
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Table 14: Regression Result Model (2) – Fixed-effects, Low Corruption 
Results from fixed-effects regression for countries with low corruption (high investor protection) utilizing the 
approach of of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (2) level of cash. Xt is the level of variable X in 
year t; dXt is the change in the level of X from year t-1 to year t, Xt – Xt-1, divided by assets in year t ; dXt+1 is 
the change in the level of X from year t to year t+1 , Xt+1 – Xt. All variables are divided by the value of total 
assets. V is the market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year end as the sum of market value of equity, the 
book value of short-term debt and book value of long-term debt. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus 
interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. NA equals total assets minus liquid assets, RD, is 
Research and Development expense; 0 if value is missing, I is Interest expense, D is dividends calculated as 
common dividends paid, and L is liquid assets (cash plus marketable securities). The estimated regression is:  
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + 
β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15Li,t + β16dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
Fixed-effects (within) regression = 52439
Group variable: typenum = 11928
= 1
= 94.4
= 10
= 45.78
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0412 = 0.0000
Robust
V Coef. Std. Err. t               P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Ei,t   -3.390675 .8037863 -4.966227 -1.815123
dEi,t .6368633 .2021792 .2405592 1.033167
dEi,t+1 -1.013316 .283565 -1.56915 -.4574823
dNAi,t  1.048443 .239132 .5797056 1.517181
dNAi,t+1 1.006044 .0609094 .8866515 1.125436
RDi,t  2.914634 1.044948 .8663648 4.962903
dRDi,t 1.860595 .7637846 .3634523 3.357737
dRDi,t+1 7.61124 .9389494 5.770746 9.451734
Ii,t  152.1243 513.058 -853.553 1157.802
dIi,t 1057.47 408.1801 257.3706 1857.57
dIi,t+1 -395.0403 1016.846 -2388.224 1598.144
Di,t  12.11202 1.750228 8.681285 15.54275
dDi,t .0870225 .6167703 -1.121948 1.295993
dDi,t+1 7.829299 .8958228 6.07334 9.585257
Li,t 1.111743 .5445498 .0443369 2.17915
dVi,t+1 -.2432629 .0249024 -.2920757 -.1944502
Constant 1.250479 .1066945 1.04134 1.459618
sigma_u 3.70265
sigma_e 1.9941123
rho 0.7751633 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
8.74   0.000
2.04   0.041
-9.77   0.000
11.72   0.000
0.14   0.888
2.59   0.010
-0.39   0.698
3.15   0.002
-3.57   0.000
4.38   0.000
16.52   0.000
2.79   0.005
6.92   0.000
-4.22   0.000
Number of obs
Number of groups
R-sq:  within  = 0.2087 Obs per group: min
between = 0.2447 avg
overall = 0.2563 max
F(17,11927)
Prob > F
2.44   0.015
8.11   0.000
0.30   0.767
 
38 
 
We now follow the same procedure and perform OLS and Fixed-effects regressions for all 
seven investor protection variables. The results are shown in Table 15 and 16. We only report 
the results for the two relevant coefficients, β12 and β15. First we study hypothesis 1 by 
analyzing the results in Table 15.  
All our OLS regressions, except the one where we measure investor protection by the anti-
director index, give estimated coefficients on cash that are higher in high protection countries  
than in low protection countries. This difference is significant at a 1%-level for all investor 
protection variables, except corruption, which does not provide significant results. In section 
2.1, we discuss some concerns we have regarding the anti-director measure. Low correlation 
with the other measures of investor protection is the source of our concern. Not surprisingly 
we again see a contrast between this proxy and the others in the regression results. The anti-
directory index does not seem to measure investor protection appropriately and we will 
consider this variable less important in the following analysis. The regression results in Table 
15 provide strong evidence towards hypothesis 1 that cash is worth more in countries with 
higher investor protection. More specifically, when looking at the coefficients from the OLS 
regressions for the various protection variables (excluding anti-director index), we get that a 
one dollar increase in cash holdings adds between 1.84 and 2.13 dollars to firm value in high 
investor protection countries, and between 0.84 and 1.29 in low investor protection countries.  
We observe similar results from the fixed-effects regressions. In general, the estimated 
coefficients obtain lower values. Nevertheless, all the differences in the value of cash between 
high and low investor protection countries are significant at a 1%- or 5%-level, with cash 
being valued higher in high protection countries than low protection countries. Again, we see 
the anti-director index being the exception. Excluding the results for the anti-director index, a 
one dollar increase in cash is valued between 1.39 and 1.59 in high investor protection 
countries and 0.61 and 0.75 in low investor protection countries. 
The regression analysis using model (1) provides support for hypothesis 1, except for when 
we use corruption or the anti-director index as a proxy for investor protection. We observe 
that the results from the FE-regression appear more realistic. Dollar values exceeding 1 seem 
unrealistic especially in countries where investor protection is poor. We will discuss possible 
explanations for the high coefficients in the next sub-section. Overall we conclude that our 
analysis provides extensive evidence that poor investor protection in a country leads to cash 
being valued at a discount.   
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Table 15: Regression Results Model (1), Change in Cash 
Results from the OLS and fixed-effects regression utilizing the approach of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (1) change in cash. The results are shown for the 
seven different investor protection measures. Protecting Investors is the protecting investor rank from Doing Business, Polcon V is the measure for political stability, 
Law/Order is the measure of the rule of law from international country risk group, ICRGP is the overall score form international country risk group, exprisk is expropriation 
risk, corruption is the measure of corruption for international country risk group and the anti-director index is the measure of minority shareholders rights. The results reported 
are the results for the coefficients β12 and β15. The t-statistics for the difference between high and low investor protection countries is reported and together with the 
significance level of the difference. Regression model, change in cash: 
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dLi,t + β16dLi,t+1 + 
β17dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
Low protection High protection Low protection
Protecting investors
β12  (dividends) 14.79 16.40 -1.16 11.84 10.25 0.78
β15  (change in cash) 1.95 0.95 2.98 *** 1.43 0.61 3.02 ***
Polcon V
β12  (dividends) 15.15 16.06 -0.50 10.50 12.13 -0.57
β15  (change in cash) 2.13 0.90 3.88 *** 1.59 0.69 2.78 ***
Law/order
β12  (dividends) 16.24 13.21 1.89 * 11.94 8.74 1.54
β15  (change in cash) 1.94 0.85 2.95 *** 1.39 0.64 2.54 **
ICRGP
β12  (dividends) 16.26 13.23 1.89 * 11.88 8.82 1.48
β15  (change in cash) 1.94 0.84 2.96 *** 1.39 0.65 2.50 **
Exprisk
β12  (dividends) 17.47 13.68 2.59 *** 12.03 9.89 0.94
β15  (change in cash) 2.06 0.89 3.49 *** 1.48 0.66 2.94 ***
Corruption
β12  (dividends) 14.65 12.81 1.25 12.88 7.48 2.59 ***
β15  (change in cash) 1.84 1.29 1.60 1.40 0.75 2.26 **
Anti-director index
β12  (dividends) 15.98 16.30 -0.16 11.57 10.47 0.41
β15  (change in cash) 1.41 2.24 -2.04 ** 0.71 1.86 -3.43 ***
Significance level difference: * 10%-level, ** 5%-level, *** 1%-level
Model (1) change in cash
T-stat of 
difference
T-stat of 
difference
Investor protection 
variable
High protection
OLS regressions Fixed effects regressions
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The estimated coefficients for dividends, β12, are evaluated to investigate hypothesis 2. The 
results from the OLS regressions show significant differences between high and low investor 
protection countries for Law/Order, ICRGP and exprisk. They all yield the result that 
dividends add more to firm value in countries with high investor protection than low 
protection countries. This is the opposite of what we expect. The results are significant at a 
10%-level for Law/Order and ICRGP, and at a 1%-level for exprisk. The remaining results 
are insignificant. In our range of OLS regressions, one dollar of dividends is valued between 
14.65 and 17.47 for high protection countries and between 12.81 and 16.40 in low protection 
countries. These coefficients are rather high, which we will discuss in further detail later. 
The fixed-effects regressions show that only the corruption variable gives a significant result 
for the difference in the value of dividends. This regression shows dividends having a higher 
value in countries with high protection than countries with low protection. Again, this is 
contrary to what our hypothesis predicts. The difference is significant at a 1%-level. The 
value of one dollar dividends is between 10.50 and 12.88 in countries with high investor 
protection and between 7.48 and 12.13 in countries with low protection. Hence our analysis 
suggests rejecting hypothesis 2.  
Using model (1), the analysis provides extensive support for hypothesis 1. However we find 
no support for hypothesis 2. 
Table 16 shows the regression results using model (2), the level of cash. When investigating 
hypothesis 1, the OLS regressions using Polcon V, Law/Order and ICRGP provide significant 
results at the 1%-level that support our hypothesis. The estimates show cash having a higher 
value in high protection countries than low protection countries. Exprisk finds the same 
support at a 5%-level. Once again the anti-director index gives contradicting results, 
significant at the 1%-level. The protecting investors and corruption variables yield no 
significant results for cash.  The results from the OLS regressions infer that one dollar of cash 
is worth between 2.27 and 2.72 in countries with high investor protection, excluding anti-
director index. For low protection countries, the value is between 1.44 and 2.08.
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Table 16: Regression Results Model (2), Level of Cash 
Results from the OLS and fixed-effects regression utilizing the approach of of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model 2 level of cash. The results are shown for the 
seven different investor protection measures. Protecting Investors is the protecting investor rank from Doing Business, Polcon V is the measure for political stability, 
Law/Order is the measure of the rule of law from international country risk group, ICRGP is the overall score form international country risk group, exprisk is expropriation 
risk, corruption is the measure of corruption for international country risk group and the anti-director index is the measure of minority shareholders rights. The results reported 
are the results for the coefficients β12 and β15. The t-statistics for the difference between high and low investor protection countries is reported and together with the 
significance level of the difference. Regression model, level of cash: 
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15Li,t + 
β16dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
Low protection High protection Low protection
Protecting Investors
β12  (dividends) 14.61 15.84 0.87 10.75 10.08 0.48
β15  (level of cash) 2.45 2.08 -1.44 1.14 1.16 -0.12
Polcon V
β12  (dividends) 15.97 14.92 0.58 9.78 11.57 -1.33
β15  (level of cash) 2.72 1.58 4.26 *** 1.20 1.00 1.13
Law/order
β12  (dividends) 16.60 12.34 2.61 *** 11.10 8.38 2.04 **
β15  (level of cash) 2.36 1.46 3.26 *** 1.10 1.02 0.38
ICRGP
β12  (dividends) 16.62 12.36 2.61 *** 11.05 8.45 1.94 *
β15  (level of cash) 2.37 1.44 3.37 *** 1.09 1.03 0.30
Exprisk
β12  (dividends) 17.73 12.77 3.34 *** 10.97 9.54 1.08
β15  (level of cash) 2.48 1.81 2.46 ** 1.11 1.11 0.01
Corruption
β12  (dividends) 15.01 11.90 2.10 ** 12.11 7.02 2.53 **
β15  (level of cash) 2.27 1.96 1.23 1.11 0.93 0.30
Anti-director index β12  (dividends) 15.50 16.65 -0.58 11.08 9.64 1.02
β15  (level of cash) 1.98 3.37 -3.57 *** 1.08 1.19 -0.65
Significance level difference: * 10%-level, ** 5%-level, *** 1%-level
T-stat of 
difference
T-stat of 
difference
Investor protection variable High protection
Model (2) level of cash
OLS regressions Fixed effects regressions
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For the fixed-effects regressions we find no significant results for the difference in the value 
of cash. The value of one dollar of cash in the fixed-effects regression is between 0.93 and 
1.20 for both groups.  
These findings provide support for hypothesis 1 using model (2). However, the findings are 
not as robust as for model (1), as all the fixed-effects regressions deliver insignificant results. 
When we examine the estimated coefficients on dividends from the OLS regressions, and 
thereby test hypothesis 2, we find that dividends have a significantly higher value in high 
investor protection countries than in low investor protection countries using law/order, 
ICRGP, exprisk and corruption as proxies for investor protection. The differences are 
significant at a 1%-level for Law/Order, ICRGP and exprisk and at a 5%-level for corruption. 
These results provide additional support for rejecting hypothesis 2. The other investor 
protection variables show differences between low and high protection countries that are not 
significant. The value of one dollar in dividend is between 14.61 and 17.73 for high investor 
protection countries and between 11.90 and 15.84 for low protection countries. 
The fixed-effects regressions deliver significant results for the difference in the value of 
dividends when using law/order, ICRGP and corruption as measures of investor protection, all 
with dividends having a higher value in high protection countries than low protection 
countries. Again we find results that contradict our expectations for hypothesis 2. The value 
of one dollar in dividends is between 9.78 and 12.11 for high protection countries and 7.02 
and 11.57 for low protection countries. Using model (2) to test hypothesis 2, we find no 
support for this hypothesis.  
The results from our regressions provide some conclusive evidence. All regressions – except 
when using anti-director index as the investor protection proxy – give the result that cash is 
worth more in countries with high investor protection than in countries with low investor 
protection, and thereby support hypothesis 1. For model (1), the results from both OLS 
regressions and fixed-effects regressions are significant at a 1%- or 5%-level, except the OLS 
result for corruption. Using model (2), the results are only significant using OLS regressions 
for some variables, and on a 5%- or 10%-level. In sum, we can conclude that our analysis 
does provide strong support for hypothesis 1 and that from our dataset it seems that cash 
really is valued at a discount when investor protection is poor.  
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Our analysis on dividends’ contributions to firm value does not provide any support for 
hypothesis 2. Some of the regressions deliver insignificant results that support our hypothesis 
but many regressions indicate that the hypothesis should be rejected. We also observe that the 
coefficients on dividends seem exceptionally large. A possible explanation for this could be 
that many companies report dividends at zero. The data on this variable is very limited and the 
relationships we find might be due to other factors making the relations spurious.  Other 
reasons will be discussed in the next sub-section.  
5.1 Comparison of results  
Some of our findings are interesting if one compares them with the findings of Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson (2006). First, while our results provide support for hypothesis 1, 
similarly to the results of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), they do not provide the 
same support for hypothesis 2. There can be many reasons Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson 
(2006) find support for both hypotheses, while we do not. Our sample is much larger than 
their sample, which leads us to rely more on our results. The difference in results might also 
be related to the classification we obtain when dividing the countries based on the seven 
investor protection variables. Some of the countries are classified as high protection countries 
in our sample, but were classified as low protection countries in the original article. The 
change in classification is a result of uneven development of the assorted countries and it 
implies that our classifications are not identical to the classification in the original article. 
When comparing our results to the results of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), the 
coefficients we estimate for both cash and dividends (β12 and β15) are prominently higher. 
First, regarding cash, we consistently find coefficients for cash with values exceeding 1, with 
the implication that one additional dollar in cash increases firm value by more than one dollar.  
An explanation for this could be that there is a shortage of liquidity in the market during our 
period, and that having one dollar in the company ensures the company’s ability to undertake 
profitable investments. Furthermore, in connection to the precautionary motive, it is possible 
that the volatility is higher in our period and that this increases the value of those firms that 
hold precautionary cash holdings. Additionally, a possible explanation can be found in the tax 
motive. If there has been changes in tax regimes in our period, holding cash could be tax 
advantaged. 
If we investigate the agency motive closer it is possible that our period has better governance 
than the period that Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006) investigate. If this is the case, 
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following hypothesis 1, we expect cash to be of greater value in our period, due to lower 
agency cost. We can briefly investigate this by looking at the investor protection variables. 
Table 17 shows the average and median for our investor protection variables and Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson’s (2006) investor protection variables. 
Table 17: Median and Average Investor Protection Comparisson 
The median and average of the various investor protection variables are reported for this thesis and Pinkowitz 
Stulz and Williamson (2006). ICRGP is the overall score form international country risk group, corruption is the 
measure of corruption for international country risk group, law/order is the measure of the rule of law, Polcon V 
is the measure for political stability, exprisk is expropriation risk, anti-director is the anti-director index 
ICRGP Corruption Law/order Polcon Exprisk Anti-director
This paper median 84.98 6.63 8.50 0.75 9.35 4.00
This paper average 81.43 6.60 8.04 0.72 8.63 3.76
PSW median 79.41 8.11 8.82 0.74 9.35 3.00
PSW average 75.44 7.56 8.40 0.73 8.63 3.17  
We observe that both ICRGP and the anti-director index have much larger values on both the 
average and the median in our sample. This indicates better governance in general in our 
period. The differences within the other variables are not as prominent, except for the 
corruption proxy, which tells the opposite story. The increase in investor protection we 
observe in some of our measures of investor protection could explain some of the increase in 
the coefficients for cash.  
With regards to dividends, β12, a higher value of the estimated coefficient could be consistent 
with high agency problems. Nevertheless, a high value for cash, exceeding 1 – which 
indicates low agency problems – contradicts this. A possible explanation to such a high 
market valuation of dividends could be that fewer companies are paying dividends. The firms 
that do, may then receive high valuations of their dividends. Nonetheless, it is difficult to 
justify the exceptionally high values that we observe. A second explanation can be related to 
what kind of investors are present in the marketplace. If there are many investors that need a 
steady stream of cash and therefore particularly value dividend payments, for example 
pension funds, we could observe a very high valuation of dividends. 
Finally, the unexpected results might occur because the regression specification is ad-hoc and 
does not result from a formal model. As such, there is a possibility of the model being 
misspecified.  
 
 
45 
 
6 Robustness tests and validity 
6.1 Robustness  
There are some potential problems related to our regression analysis. There could be 
autocorrelation, time trends or year specific effects. We tested our regression using corruption 
as the proxy for investor protection for year specific variation. We use the fixed-effects 
regressions and extend model (1) change in cash to control for year specific effects by 
introducing a dummy variable for each year. The results we obtain are reported in Table 18 
and Table 19, and resemble the results from earlier regressions where we use corruption as an 
investor protection proxy. The estimated     in the regression for low investor protection 
countries obtains a value of 8, while the value is 12.78 in high investor protection countries. 
The difference is significant at a 5%-level. For    , low investor protection countries have a 
value of 0.74 and high investor protection countries have a value of 1.37. The difference is 
significant at a 5%-level.  
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Table 18: Regression Result –Dummy for Year, High Corruption 
Results from fixed-effects regression for countries with high corruption (low investor protection) utilizing the 
approach of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (1) change in cash with adding year dummies. Xt is 
the level of variable X in year t; dXt is the change in the level of X from year t-1 to year t, Xt – Xt-1, divided by 
assets in year t ; dXt+1 is the change in the level of X from year t to year t+1 , Xt+1 – Xt. All variables are divided 
by the value of total assets. V is the market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year end as the sum of market 
value of equity, the book value of short-term debt and book value of long-term debt. E is earnings before 
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. NA equals total assets minus 
liquid assets, RD, is Research and Development expense; 0 if value is missing, I is Interest expense, D is 
dividends calculated as common dividends paid, and L is liquid assets (cash plus marketable securities).   
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 46640
Group variable: typenum Number of groups = 9054
R-sq: within  = 0.0633 Obs per group: min = 1
between = 0.0345 avg = 55.2
overall = 0.0413 max = 10
F(26,9053) = 36.77
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0049 Prob > F = 0.0000
(Std.Err. Adjusted for 9054 clusters in typenum)
Robust
V Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Ei,t   -.0744035 .2169239 -.4996235 .3508164
dEi,t .2096417 .1090915 -.0042024 .4234858
dEi,t+1 .1985523 .1445158 -.0847313 .4818358
dNAi,t  .1822337 .0805547 .0243282 .3401391
dNAi,t+1 .559278 .0977451 .3676755 .7508806
RDi,t  1.260641 1.131232 -.95683 3.478112
dRDi,t 1.490703 .823321 -.1231924 3.104598
dRDi,t+1 2.254268 1.018581 .2576186 4.250917
Ii,t  -3.994482 11.47459 -26.48726 18.4983
dIi,t 712.2312 184.1416 351.2721 1073.19
dIi,t+1 -203.8744 274.4457 -741.8501 334.1012
Di,t  8.008312 1.038161 5.973281 10.04334
dDi,t .7071157 .5830823 -.4358574 1.850089
dDi,t+1 4.612554 .61919 3.398802 5.826306
dLi,t .7374024 .1708471 .4025034 1.072301
dLi,t+1 .9747235 .3256387 .3363981 1.613049
dVi,t+1 -.1903279 .0938972 -.3743876 -.0062683
y2 .1636981 .041157 .0830211 .2443752
y3 .0901469 .082819 -.0721971 .252491
y4 -.10315 .0703992 -.2411482 .0348483
y5 -.1916481 .0497203 -.2891112 -.094185
y6 -.2082821 .0282104 -.2635808 -.1529834
y7 -.1308431 .024218 -.1783158 -.0833704
y8 -.0757183 .0227762 -.1203648 -.0310718
y9 -.0208895 .0248814 -.0696627 .0278837
y10 -.1338814 .0515093 -.2348513 -.0329116
Constant 1.017455 .0399205 .9392021 1.095709
sigma_u 1.800395
sigma_e 1.3530904
rho .6390469 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
1.21   0.225
-0.35   0.728
-0.34   0.732
1.92   0.055
3.87   0.000
-0.74   0.458
7.71   0.000
2.21   0.027
1.37   0.170
2.26   0.024
5.72   0.000
1.11   0.265
1.81   0.070
7.45   0.000
4.32   0.000
2.99   0.003
-2.03   0.043
3.98   0.000
-3.32   0.001
-0.84   0.401
-2.60   0.009
25.49   0.000
1.09   0.276
-1.47   0.143
-3.85   0.000
-7.38   0.000
-5.40   0.000
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Table 19: Regression Result – Dummy for Year, Low Corruption 
Results from fixed-effects regression for countries with low corruption (high investor protection) utilizing the 
approach of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (1) change in cash with adding year dummies. Xt is 
the level of variable X in year t; dXt is the change in the level of X from year t-1 to year t, Xt – Xt-1, divided by 
assets in year t ; dXt+1 is the change in the level of X from year t to year t+1 , Xt+1 – Xt. All variables are divided 
by the value of total assets. V is the market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year end as the sum of market 
value of equity, the book value of short-term debt and book value of long-term debt. E is earnings before 
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. NA equals total assets minus 
liquid assets, RD, is Research and Development expense; 0 if value is missing, I is Interest expense, D is 
dividends calculated as common dividends paid, and L is liquid assets (cash plus marketable securities).   
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 52439
Group variable: typenum Number of groups = 11928
R-sq:  within  = 0.2384 Obs per group: min = 1
between = 0.2388 avg = 44.4
overall = 0.2617 max = 10
F(26,11927) = 46.25
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0380 Prob > F = 0.0000
Robust
V Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Ei,t   -3.496758 .822629 -5.109245 -1.884271
dEi,t .6544786 .2046236 .2533831 1.055574
dEi,t+1 -1.068187 .2880658 -1.632843 -.5035311
dNAi,t  .9268962 .2259109 .484074 1.369718
dNAi,t+1 .9412912 .0529012 .8375962 1.044986
RDi,t  2.421937 1.005011 .4519514 4.391922
dRDi,t 1.763797 .7602317 .2736185 3.253975
dRDi,t+1 6.477645 .9202959 4.673715 8.281575
Ii,t  -676.1949 714.5311 -2076.792 724.4024
dIi,t 998.3444 538.0002 -56.22356 2052.912
dIi,t+1 -3128.382 2248.52 -7535.847 1279.084
Di,t  12.77816 1.709916 9.426445 16.12987
dDi,t -.1144406 .6070239 -1.304306 1.075425
dDi,t+1 7.990431 .9009798 6.224364 9.756498
dLi,t 1.368832 .229548 .9188802 1.818783
dLi,t+1 1.852898 .1760522 1.507807 2.197989
dVi,t+1 -.273792 .0263651 -.3254719 -.222112
y2 .0294106 .0551239 -.0786413 .1374624
y3 -.3150294 .0718293 -.4558265 -.1742322
y4 -.5789684 .0781895 -.7322326 -.4257042
y5 -.7861714 .081976 -.9468578 -.6254851
y6 -.5404197 .0758181 -.6890354 -.3918039
y7 -.4953068 .0758376 -.6439608 -.3466528
y8 -.5024162 .0724994 -.6445269 -.3603055
y9 -.4451996 .0777912 -.5976829 -.2927162
y10 -.6028657 .096408 -.7918411 -.4138902
Constant 1.81266 .0827612 1.650434 1.974885
sigma_u 3.7163937
sigma_e 1.9565633
rho .78298185 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
-5.72   0.000
-6.25   0.000
21.90   0.000
-7.40   0.000
-9.59   0.000
-7.13   0.000
-6.53   0.000
-6.93   0.000
5.96   0.000
10.52   0.000
-10.38   0.000
0.53   0.594
-4.39   0.000
8.87   0.000
1.86   0.064
-4.25   0.000
3.20   0.001
-3.71   0.000
-1.39   0.164
7.47   0.000
-0.19   0.850
-0.95   0.344
4.10   0.000
17.79   0.000
2.41   0.016
2.32   0.020
7.04   0.000
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6.2 Economic development 
The regression analysis in this thesis is performed by using variables for investor protection to 
separate the countries in our sample. The variables measuring investor protection might 
merely act as proxies for economic and financial development. From Table 20 (correlation 
matrix, also presented in section 4, we observe that all our investor protection variables, with 
the exception of the anti-directory index and protecting investor variable, are highly correlated 
with our measures of economic and financial development, namely; Stock market 
capitalization (Scap), Stock market turnover (Sturn),  GDP, bond market capitalization (Bcap) 
and Total market capitalization (Tcap). To investigate this issue further, we now apply 
regression model (1) and (2) using economic and financial development measures to split our 
group of countries in two: high and low economic/financial development.  
Table 20: Correlation matrix 
Correlation between the various investor protection and economic development variables.  ICRGP, the overall 
political risk measure, Corruption, the level of government corruption, and Law/Order, the law-and-order 
tradidion in each country are all from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRGP).  Polcon V measures 
political stability, exprisk the expropriation risk, antidir is the anti-director index and ProtInvest is the protecting 
investors variable from Doing Business. In terms of the financial development variables, Scap is stock market 
capitalization, Sturn is stock market turnover, GDP is GDP per capita, Bcap is bond market capitalization and 
Tcap is total market capitalization. The correlations between the investor protection measures and the financial 
development measures are highlighted in the grey frame.  
ICRGP 1
Corruption 0.882 1
Law/order 0.886 0.838 1
Polcon V 0.576 0.587 0.650 1
Exprisk 0.851 0.745 0.844 0.743 1
Antidirr -0.145 -0.088 -0.055 0.135 0.011 1
ProtInvest 0.013 0.003 -0.147 -0.095 -0.115 -0.468 1
Scap 0.193 0.231 0.183 0.215 0.206 0.326 -0.125 1
Sturn 0.152 0.119 0.298 0.364 0.382 0.058 0.109 -0.012 1
GDP 0.864 0.750 0.820 0.579 0.858 -0.138 -0.018 0.271 0.246 1
Bcap 0.573 0.686 0.551 0.425 0.579 -0.013 0.012 0.249 0.252 0.570 1
Tcap 0.365 0.437 0.349 0.333 0.379 0.274 -0.102 0.941 0.078 0.430 0.562 1
TcapICRGP Corruption Law/order Polcon V Exprisk Antidirr ProtInvest Scap Sturn GDP Bcap
 
Table 21 and 22 show the results from our regression dividing our sample countries into 
groups of high and low economic development
6
.   
                                                          
6
 We split using the median 
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Table 21: Regression Results Model (1), Change in Cash 
Results from the OLS and fixed-effects regression utilizing the approach of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (1) change in cash. The results are shown for the 
five different financial development measures. Sturn is stock market turnover, Scap is stock market capitalization, Bcap is bond market capitalization, Tcap is total market 
capitalization and GDP is GDP per capita.The results reported are the results for the coefficients β12 and β15. The t-statistics for the difference between high and low 
financially developed countries is reported and together with the significance level of the difference. Regression model, change in cash: 
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dLi,t + β16dLi,t+1 + 
β17dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
OLS regressions Fixed regressions
Economic development High Low High Low
Sturn
β12  (dividends) 19.38 13.10 3.37 *** 11.77 10.80 0.45
β15  (change in cash) 2.09 1.32 1.98 ** 1.50 0.57 3.36 ***
Scap
β12  (dividends) 15.95 13.23 1.83 * 12.73 8.21 2.26 **
β15  (change in cash) 1.86 0.74 3.18 *** 1.35 0.28 3.57 ***
Bcap
β12  (dividends) 14.86 15.09 -0.16 12.01 9.82 1.05
β15  (change in cash) 1.88 1.27 1.74 * 1.41 0.71 2.50 **
Tcap
β12  (dividends) 14.93 12.76 1.37 12.91 5.98 3.41 ***
β15  (change in cash) 1.78 1.78 -0.01 1.33 0.75 1.88 *
GDP
β12  (dividends) 16.78 13.21 2.39 ** 12.12 9.23 1.37
β15  (change in cash) 1.91 0.84 2.82 *** 1.38 0.61 2.56 ***
T-stat of 
difference
T-stat of 
difference
Model (1) change in cash
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Table 22: Regression Results Model (2), Level of Cash 
Results from the OLS and fixed-effects regression utilizing the approach of Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), model (2) level of cash. The results are shown for the 
five different financial development measures. Sturn is stock market turnover, Scap is stock market capitalization, Bcap is bond market capitalization, Tcap is total market 
capitalization and GDP is GDP per capita.The results reported are the results for the coefficients β12 and β15. The t-statistics for the difference between high and low 
financially developed countries is reported and together with the significance level of the difference. Regression model, level of cash: 
Vi,t = β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15Li,t + 
β16dVi,t+1 + εi,t 
Economic development High Low High Low
Sturn
β12 (dividends) 19.27 12.58 3.54 *** 10.86 10.50 0.17
β15 (level of cash) 2.45 1.96 1.61 1.18 1.02 0.24
Scap
β12 (dividends) 15.85 12.72 2.08 ** 11.84 8.06 1.99 **
β15 (level of cash) 2.36 1.60 2.54 ** 1.13 1.14 -0.02
Bcap
β12 (dividends) 14.60 14.86 -0.18 10.97 9.53 0.73
β15 (level of cash) 2.31 2.34 -0.11 1.15 1.13 0.03
Tcap
β12 (dividends) 14.74 12.50 1.41 12.04 5.75 3.20 ***
β15 (level of cash) 2.22 2.19 0.12 1.12 1.02 0.18
GDP
β12 (dividends) 17.04 12.39 3.07 *** 11.32 8.83 1.23
β15 (level of cash) 2.37 1.45 3.25 *** 1.10 1.14 -0.06
Significance level difference: * 10%-level, ** 5%-level, *** 1%-level
T-stat of 
difference
T-stat of 
difference
Model (2) level of cash
OLS regressions Fixed regressions
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The results from using regression model (1) are presented in Table 21. We observe that our 
findings resemble those obtained using investor protection variables to divide our sample. 
This is something we would expect if investor protection simply act as a proxy for economic 
development. Our results show significant differences in β15, indicating that cash is worth 
more in countries with high economic development. Further, the results for β12 also follow the 
same pattern as the results we find using investor protection proxies, but are somewhat less 
significant.  
Table 22 shows the results using regression model (2). These results similarly resemble the 
results obtained in the main part of the thesis, with low significance levels of the differences 
between highly and less economically developed countries. 
These observations and results raise a concern that the higher value of cash in countries with 
better investor protection is a result of the financial and economic development rather than 
investor protection. Haidar (2009) suggests that countries with better investor protection grow 
faster. This would imply that good investor protection leads to higher GDP. Such a 
relationship would imply a circular causality and would in practice make it close to 
impossible to separate the two effects. Nonetheless, our results provide a strong indication 
that proper investor protection does affect the valuation of cash positively. 
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7 Concluding remarks 
In this thesis, our goal is to investigate whether the intensity of agency problems across 
countries affects the cross-country valuation of firms. We test this through two hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis states that cash should be valued at a discount in countries with poor 
investor protection. The second states that dividends add greater value to firms in countries 
with poor shareholder protection. Through regression analysis we find supportive evidence 
for hypothesis 1 however not for hypothesis 2. Our methods and analysis are based on the 
analysis done by Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006). Our results differ from theirs as 
they find evidence for both hypotheses. Overall we conclude that from our data it appears that 
agency problems are of importance when it comes to assessing the value of a firm’s cash. In 
terms of dividends the level of investor protection seems  less relevant. We cannot rule out the 
possibility that our results merely reflect economic and financial development. Nevertheless, 
our study indicates a positive relationship between valuation of a firm’s cash holdings and 
investor protection. 
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9 Appendix 
 
9.1 Appendix 1 – Overview of data from Thompson Worldscope database 
 
Mnemonic code Variable name 
WC06010 Industry 
1 Industrial 
2 Utility 
3 Transportation 
4 Bank/savings -loan 
5 Insurance 
6 Other financial 
WC02999 Total assets 
WC02003 Cash 
WC05376 Common dividends 
WC 08001 Market capitalization 
WC03255 Total debt 
WC01201 Research and Developement 
WC01075 Interest expence Total 
WC19181 Earnings 
 
 
 
